BTC must cross the proprietary CrossLink MPC bridge before it can be pledged, meaning the borrower no longer holds L1 UTXOs; custody rests with an unproven cross‑chain system.

Platform explicitly forbids any reuse of collateral; each vault is segregated and not rehypothecated.

Libre’s Bitcoin-backed loans inherit two custody layers: (i) bridge layer—BTC locked in the CrossLink MPC-TSS quorum (captured in Collateral = 7); (ii) vault layer—the wrapped BTC that borrowers actually pledge sits in a dedicated address controlled by the same 21-validator MPC quorum. Borrowers have no unilateral exit, and no independent audit of the wallet tech or key-management stack has been published, so the DeFi ladder assigns Custody = 7, signalling a medium-to-high custody risk.

Although the documentation references advanced cryptography, the roadmap still includes “Enhanced Security Measures: additional auditing,” which have yet to be released. Governance remains concentrated among 21 DPoS validators. Transparency is limited — multiple development resources are inaccessible or broken. Key repositories and documentation links such as github.com/libre-chain, contract examples, GitLab API docs, and GitHub issues return either 404 errors or are entirely unavailable, suggesting a lack of public developer access and poor disclosure.

Borrowers are locked to the Libre Delegated‑PoS chain for the life of the loan—a chain whose LIBRE token has fallen ~90 % since 2023. The network relies on a 21‑validator quorum that can upgrade contracts and consensus rules. Vote data from the Libre block‑producer dashboard (libre.antelope.tools snapshot on 24 Jul 2025, ≈ 212 k total votes) show the top‑2 validators control ≈ 56 % and the top‑5 control ≈ 76 % of stake. Most validators are unlicensed private entities with no publicly known founders. Many are affiliated with Libre or EOS. Operational red flags are common: the website of Hotstart (second largest validator) serves a blank, non‑HTTPS page, EOS Sweden (#5) has publicly declared shutdown, and Quantum‑Blok (#6) has dead social‑media links, calling validator availability and governance resilience into question. Given this concentration, affiliation overlap, and lack of independent attestations, we conservatively treat the validator set as a tightly affiliated group and assign Platform = 10 until Libre publishes verifiable ownership proofs and operational audits.

Closed, provider-controlled oracle with no public methodology; can embed hidden spreads when converting BTC ↔ USDT.

30 pp buffer (50% → 80%). Liquidation threshold is 80% LTV, but enforcement occurs only after a 72-hour grace period. Borrower receives warnings if LTV exceeds 70%.

Borrowers choose from fixed-term pools; lenders lock USDT at the same fixed rates.

Libre offers verifiable on‑chain vault addresses and an open reserve‑audit script, but still withholds its MPC bridge code and provides no proof of liabilities.

Libre loans pay out in a wrapped version of Tether’s USDT minted on Libre. Redemption requires the CrossLink MPC bridge; if the validator set halts or censures peg‑outs, the token becomes illiquid despite Tether’s backing. On-chain trading depth is minimal: Libre’s only AMM pools hold a very small TVL and daily volume is negligible, with no professional market-makers. This bridge-dependent, thin-liquidity wrapper fits the rubric’s ‘mid-tier or thin-liquidity stable-coin’ tier, so we assign Loan-Currency = 7.

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Bitcoin-backed lending launched April 19, 2025.

Legal pages reference “Satoshi LLC / Bizan Bizz” but give no lending license or clear regulatory domicile.